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MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION:
THE INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE LOOPHOLE
Juliana Moraes Liu*
ABSTRACT
Human trafficking through religious organizations is a
frequently overlooked issue in both human trafficking and First
Amendment scholarship. In the face of expanding protections
for religious organizations, the ministerial exception has grown
into a powerful doctrine that shields religious entities from
employment-related legal consequences in civil courts. Courts
must recognize the ministerial exception’s expanded reach and
refuse to allow its operation as a jurisdictional bar for human
trafficking cases arising under the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act (“TVPA”). Lower courts in the United States have begun
addressing the intersection of the ministerial exception and the
TVPA and arrived at opposing conclusions. This Article
provides legal and normative justifications for refusing to apply
the ministerial exception to trafficking claims and contributes to
First and Thirteenth Amendment scholarship by furnishing
courts with several interpretive alternatives that can be used to
resolve the tension that arises when these constitutional
provisions come into conflict.
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INTRODUCTION
An estimated forty million people across the world are
victims of human trafficking, with hundreds of thousands of
those victims believed to be in the United States. 1 Human
trafficking is defined as compelling someone to engage in
commercial labor or sex against their will through force, fraud,
or coercion. 2 While traffickers come in all forms, human
trafficking through the use of religious organizations is an under*J.D. 2020, Yale Law School; B.A. 2017, Columbia University. Juliana would like
to thank Ambassador Luis C.deBaca for inspiring this article and guiding it through
its development.
1
The Victims, NAT’L HUM. TRAFFICKING HOTLINE,
https://humantraffickinghotline.org/what-human-trafficking/humantrafficking/victims (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
2
22 U.S.C. § 7102 (2018).
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recognized problem in the United States. For decades, numerous
religious organizations have been suspected, accused, or found
guilty of trafficking their members and employees by forcing
them to work for the organization against their will. 3 The
Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”) is one of the most
important pieces of legislation in the United States’ fight against
human trafficking, which notably provides a civil remedy for
victims of human trafficking. 4 Unfortunately, current
interpretations and applications of the ministerial exception have
put these civil remedies in jeopardy for people subjected to
human trafficking by religious entities.
The ministerial exception is a common law outgrowth of
the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment clauses
and provides religious organizations with a safe harbor against
civil lawsuits regarding employee treatment. 5 The ministerial
3

See, e.g., United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1277-80, 1283 (6th Cir. 1988)
(affirming an involuntary servitude conviction against the leaders of the House of
Judah religious group for forcing children to do agricultural work against their will);
United States v. Broussard, 767 F. Supp. 1536, 1538, 1545 (D. Or.), amended, 767 F.
Supp. 1545 (D. Or. 1991) (allowing 29 counts of involuntary servitude against the
leader of the religious Ecclesia Athletic Association); Turner v. Unification Church,
602 F.2d 458, 458 (1st Cir. 1979) (dismissing an involuntary servitude claim against
the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, commonly
referred to as the Unification Church); Religious Leader Charged in Child Slave Labor
Case Dies, AP (Aug. 30, 2018),
https://apnews.com/4a34560670b94bbaa8dcd6d287e40fa5/Religious-leadercharged-in-child-slave-labor-case-dies; see generally Hamadou Boiro & Jónína
Einarsdóttir, “A Vicious Circle”: Repatriation of Bissau-Guinean Quranic Schoolboys From
Senegal, J. HUM. TRAFFICKING 6:3, 265–80 (Nov. 14, 2018) (discussing religiouslyaffiliated human trafficking in countries outside of the United States). On May 11,
2021 a class action complaint was filed by more than 200 Indian nationals recruited
to the United States under R-1 visas who were allegedly forced to labor by building a
Hindu temple in Robbinsville, New Jersey for over 87 hours per week at a rate of
approximately $1.20 per hour. Compl. ¶ 1-3, Mukesh Kumar et al v Bochasanwasi
Shri Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha, Inc et al. (D.N.J. 2021) (No.
3:21-cv-11048). One month earlier, a self-appointed bishop was sentenced to twelve
years in federal prison for labor trafficking and wire fraud charges after being found
guilty of coercing ministry members into forced labor. Woman Sentenced to 12 Years in
Prison for Coercing Members of Church Ministry Into Forced Labor, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, (Apr. 6, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/woman-sentenced12-years-federal-prison-coercing-members-church-ministry-forced-labor.
4
For the purposes of this article, the terms “human trafficking,” “involuntary
servitude,” and “slavery” are used largely interchangeably. While these terms may
have slightly different definitions depending on their interpretive source, the terms
here are used to mean involuntary, compelled labor, specifically the type that is
prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment; 18 U.S.C. § 1595.
5
See, e.g., Shukla v. Sharma, No. 07 CV 2972 (CBA), 2009 WL 10690810, at *2, *3
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, No. 07-CV-2972
(CBA), 2009 WL 3151109 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009).
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exception operates by denying employees standing to sue, which
deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case.6 This
effect is significant, insofar as pleading the ministerial exception
provides a near-blanket level of protection for religious
organizations.7 Once pleaded, the ministerial exception is likely
to be successful at defeating the suit.8 During the 2020 term, the
Supreme Court expanded the reach of the ministerial exception
to cover suits not only brought by titled ministers within an
organization, but also to those brought by any employee that a
religious organization believes should be covered.9 The Supreme
Court did not provide a definition of “employee” and instead
applied the ministerial exception to anyone serving an important
ministerial function, as defined by the organization itself.10 This
broad standard would also likely cover suits brought by members
of a congregation who are not formally employed by the religious
organization. The full effects of the Our Lady of Guadalupe School
decision will not be understood for a while, but with the Court
tipping right with a firm 6-3 conservative supermajority, the
ramifications of this decision are likely to be great.
While the ministerial exception has been historically
applied to labor claims arising under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and Title VII, courts have
now begun to litigate the applicability of the ministerial
exception to TVPA claims. 11 However, resolving whether the
ministerial exception should cover TVPA cases requires more
than a comparison to these federal statutes. Unlike other
employment legislation, the TVPA is rooted in the Thirteenth
Amendment and therefore necessitates unique treatment. The
Thirteenth Amendment’s protections for individuals held in
involuntary servitude elevate the TVPA beyond other workplace

6

Id.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171,
195 n.4 (2012) (explaining that the ministerial exception “operates as an affirmative
defense to an otherwise cognizable claim”).
8
See, e.g., Shukla, 2009 WL 10690810, at *4 (citing Kraft v. Rector, Churchwardens
& Vestry of Grace Church in N.Y., No. 01–CV–7871 (KMW), 2004 WL 540327, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2004)).
9
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2072 (2020)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
10
Id.
11
See Shukla, 2009 WL 10690810, at *3 (citing cases); Patsakis v. Greek Orthodox
Archdiocese of Am., 339 F. Supp. 2d 689, 694 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (citing cases).
7
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issues and mandate special consideration when confronted with
the First Amendment’s religious protections.12
Two courts in the United States have already analyzed
this issue and reached opposing conclusions. A district court in
New York resolved the question correctly, 13 and the Central
District of California erred by failing to recognize the way that
the Thirteenth Amendment distinguishes TVPA claims from
traditional labor lawsuits.14 Future litigation on this issue is likely
to arise, with the Second Circuit positioned to hear arguments
regarding the NXIVM human trafficking cases in future
appeals. 15 If more courts embrace the Central District of
California’s flawed approach, religious traffickers will gain
increased protections contrary to legal requirements, and the
United States will regress in its fight against human trafficking.
For the reasons discussed in this Article, courts should avoid
setting dangerously flawed legal precedent and refuse to apply
the ministerial exception to TVPA suits.
In this piece, I make two arguments. The first is a
doctrinal argument that the Central District of California’s
decision to apply the ministerial exception to TVPA cases is not
legally sound given both the existing jurisprudence and the
requirements of the First and Thirteenth Amendments. The
12

See, e.g., Shukla, 2009 WL 10690810, at *6.
See id.
14
See Headley v. Church of Scientology Int’l, No. CV 09-3987 DSF (MANx), 2010
WL 3184389, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2010), aff'd on other grounds, 687 F.3d 1173
(9th Cir. 2012).
15
The criminal prosecution of Keith Raniere, guru and leader of the NXIVM group,
is likely to be appealed to the Second Circuit, and the Second Circuit may be called
on to make a collateral determination on the ministerial exception. Raniere and his
co-conspirators were indicted by the Grand Jury of the Eastern District of New York
for numerous counts, including Forced Labor, Sex Trafficking, Sex Trafficking
Conspiracy, and Conspiracy to Commit Forced Labor under §§ 1589 and 1591 of the
TVPA. Indictment, No. 18-CR-204, 2019 WL 1458957 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2019);
United States v. Raniere, 384 F. Supp. 3d 282, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). Despite
NXIVM not explicitly touting itself as a religious organization, it has been described
as such by many, and Raniere came close to claiming religious protections by
referencing in his filings the Headley case from the Central District of California
which applied the ministerial exception to TVPA. Headley, 687 F.3d at 1180. By
citing to Headley in his attempt to dismiss the indictment, Raniere sought to indirectly
take advantage of the Ninth Circuit’s decision expanding the ministerial exception to
human trafficking cases. These arguments were rejected by the Eastern District of
New York but may be relitigated in future appeals. Raniere, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 314
(E.D.N.Y. 2019). If the Second Circuit discusses the ministerial exception’s
application to TVPA cases, a circuit split on this issue would be on its way to being
established.
13
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second argument approaches the question from a normative
perspective. I will explain why refusing to examine human
trafficking claims that arise between religious organizations and
their employees is pragmatically dangerous. It can create a safe
harbor for human traffickers who disguise themselves as
religious entities, and for genuine religious organizations that
deliberately embrace practices which amount to human
trafficking. While current jurisprudence supports a strong
prioritization of the Thirteenth Amendment, this piece also
discusses several doctrinally consistent interpretive alternatives
that courts could embrace to simultaneously safeguard First
Amendment protections while avoiding the pitfalls of applying
the ministerial exception to TVPA cases.
I. THE ROOTS OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
The ministerial exception stems from the basic tenets of
separation of church and state—that religious organizations
should be able to select their own proselytizers, without
government interference. 16 Its fundamental purpose is to keep
courts “out of employment disputes involving those holding
certain important positions with churches and other religious
institutions.”17 This Article revolves around three foundational
questions: how far the ministerial exception should reach, what
types of investigation it should avoid, and which employees it
should cover.18
Over the years, increased judicial hesitancy to investigate
or regulate religious organizations has allowed the ministerial
exception to grow beyond its original straight-forward
application to now cover nearly all labor disputes and

16

The ministerial exception exists to prevent state labor regulation from infringing on
a religious organization’s ability to select its ministers based on doctrine, even when
the selection criteria may otherwise be discriminatory or in violation of state and
federal laws. See, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
17
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2060 (2020).
18
See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 697–98
(1976) (determining that an Illinois Supreme Court decision finding the procedures
of the Holy Assembly of Bishops and the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox
Church for the removal of a bishop from his position to be “arbitrary and invalid”
was an impermissible violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it
constituted “improper judicial interference with the decisions of the highest
authorities of a hierarchical church”).
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employment discrimination actions. 19 Attempts to employ the
ministerial exception in human trafficking cases are a relatively
recent development in federal litigation and have only been
tested twice—leading to the differing approaches by the district
courts discussed in this article. In Shukla v. Sharma,20 a magistrate
judge on the Second Circuit refused to place human trafficking
claims under the ministerial exception’s coverage, while the
Central District of California, in Headley v. Church of Scientology
International, 21 found that the ministerial exception did indeed
reach TVPA claims.
A. Shukla v. Sharma
Shukla addressed the application of the ministerial
exception to TVPA cases as a matter of first impression and
reached the legally sound conclusion that the ministerial
exception does not apply to TVPA suits.22 Devendra Shukla was
a Hindu priest, brought to the United States on an R–1 religious
worker visa to work at the Ashram congregation in New York.23
Shukla sued the director of the Ashram under the TVPA,
alleging that his passport was confiscated upon arrival in the
country and that he was treated like a slave of the Ashram.24
Shukla was decided by Magistrate Judge Cheryl Pollak,
whose opinion was later adopted by a district court judge in the
Eastern District of New York. 25 Pollak’s opinion properly
removes the TVPA from a labor and employment framework,
discussing human trafficking not as a mere extension of improper
19

See Shukla v. Sharma, No. 07 CV 2972 (CBA), 2009 WL 10690810, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, No. 07-CV-2972
(CBA), 2009 WL 3151109 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009) (citing Kraft v. Rector,
Churchwardens & Vestry of Grace Church in N.Y., No. 01–CV–7871 (KMW), 2004
WL 540327, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2004)).
20
No. 07 CV 2972 (CBA), 2009 WL 10690810, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2009),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 07-CV-2972 (CBA), 2009 WL 3151109
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009).
21
No. CV 09-3987 DSF MAN, 2010 WL 3184389, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2010),
aff'd on other grounds, 687 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2012).
22
Shukla, 2009 WL 10690810, at *6.
23
Id. at *5.
24
Id. at *2 (alleging that he was “subjected to exploitative work conditions, tortured,
abused, and forced to live under enslaved conditions”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
25
Shukla v. Sharma, No. 07-CV-2972 (CBA), 2009 WL 3151109, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2009).
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labor practices, but as a unique type of abuse. 26 The opinion
reads “[t]he type of abuse addressed by the TVPA is so extreme,
offensive, and contrary to fundamental human rights as to
distinguish it from the type of conduct that ordinarily gives rise
to violations of labor and employment laws.” 27 The Shukla
opinion focuses on this critical distinction between traditional
wage and hour claims and human trafficking claims, explaining
that “[a]lthough labor and employment laws seek to eradicate
certain societal evils, such as poverty and discrimination, the
TVPA seeks to address the evil of human trafficking
and forced labor, both of which strike directly at the core
individual liberty.”28
B. Headley v. Church of Scientology International
In contrast, the district court in Headley affirmatively
applied the ministerial exception to a TVPA claim and allowed
the Church of Scientology to eliminate the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction through the ministerial exception.29 Referencing the
Shukla decision, Judge Fischer refused to follow the New York
court, holding that the ministerial exception does not apply to
the TVPA.30 The Headley opinion dismissed the Shukla decision
stating that “[t]he only support for this argument comes from an
out-of-circuit magistrate judge’s report and recommendation that
does not even cite to Ninth Circuit decisions on the ministerial
exception, let alone apply the exception in accordance with
Ninth Circuit case law.”31
Plaintiffs Marc and Claire Headley joined the Church of
Scientology’s secretive “Sea Org” as teenagers.32 They labored
for over 100 hours per week but received only $50 in weekly
stipends in addition to their Church-provided living expenses.33
They were also assigned additional manual labor as a form of
discipline. 34 Further, they alleged that they were unable to
26

Shukla, 2009 WL 10690810, at *7.
Id.
28
Id.
29
Headley v. Church of Scientology Int’l, No. CV 09-3987 DSF (MANx), 2010 WL
3184389, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2010).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Headley v. Church of Scientology Int’l, 687 F.3d 1173, 1174 (9th Cir. 2012).
33
Id. at 1176.
34
Id.
27
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leave.35 Claire and Marc Headley filed suit against the Church of
Scientology under the TVPA.36
Unlike Magistrate Judge Pollak on the Second Circuit,
Judge Fischer approached the TVPA and trafficking as an
extension of labor relations.37 The Headley court readily accepted
the Church of Scientology’s argument that the challenged
conduct was “doctrinally motivated,” and therefore refused to
investigate the merits of the Headleys’ claims. 38 The court
explained that “inquiry into these allegations would entangle the
Court in the religious doctrine of Scientology and the doctrinallymotivated practices of the Sea Org.”39 Judge Fisher applied the
labor-based precedent of the ministerial exception to the
trafficking claim, explaining that it would be impossible to
disentangle the Headleys’ allegations from the Church of
Scientology’s religious doctrine.40 Throughout the Ninth Circuit
opinion as well, much deference was given to the Church of
Scientology’s claims of doctrine.41 Although the Ninth Circuit
did not reach the ministerial exemption question, both the trial
court and the Ninth Circuit exhibited a reluctance to distinguish
human trafficking from existing ministerial exception
jurisprudence.42
The district court opinion improperly allows room for
human trafficking to be legitimately contained within religious
doctrine deserving of judicial protection. Judge Fisher wrote
“[d]etermining whether Scientology’s practices of routing out,
35

Id. at 1177.
Id. at 1178.
37
Headley v. Church of Scientology Int'l, No. CV 09-3987 DSF MAN, 2010 WL
3184389, at *4-6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2010).
38
Id. at *6.
39
Id.
40
For example, Claire Headley alleged that one of the methods of control exerted
over her by the Church of Scientology was its forcing her to obtain two abortions. Id.
at *5. Judge Fischer explained that “inquiry concerning the pressure Plaintiff
allegedly faced after becoming pregnant would require review of Scientology’s
doctrine prohibiting Sea Org members from raising children.” Id. at *6.
41
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by setting forth Scientology’s expectations for
its members, effectively laying out First Amendment exemptions for the
organization. Headley, 687 F.3d at 1174 (“The Sea Org demands much of its
members, renders strict discipline, imposes stringent ethical and lifestyle constraints,
and goes to great efforts to retain clergy and to preserve the integrity of the ministry.
These features of the Sea Org flow from the teachings and goals of the Scientology
religion.”).
42
See id. at 1181. See also Headley, 2010 WL 3184389, at *6.
36
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censorship, or heavy manual labor as a form of discipline, for
example, constitute involuntary servitude within the meaning of
the TVPA is precisely the type of entanglement that the Religion
Clauses prohibit.”43 This extreme deference to religious doctrine
dangerously allows the legitimization of religious practices that
would otherwise be prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment.44
The Ninth Circuit’s refusal to reach the ministerial
exemption question prevents the Headleys and others similarly
situated from using the legal system to remediate alleged human
trafficking. In fact, this district court approach would, if it were
binding precedent, legitimize human trafficking by religious
organizations and give them carte blanche to ignore the Thirteenth
Amendment. The Headley district court decision to apply the
ministerial exception to TVPA cases allows First Amendment
protections to entirely overwhelm and cast aside any Thirteenth
Amendment
concerns,
effectively
permitting
religious
organizations to engage in serious human rights abuses without any
judicial scrutiny.
II. DOCTRINALLY, IMPOSITION OF FIRST AMENDMENT
INVIOLABILITY IS AHISTORICAL AND INAPPROPRIATE IN
AN ANTI-SLAVERY SETTING
Resolving conflicts between the First and Thirteenth
Amendment requires careful attention, but upon analysis of the
legal issues at hand, it becomes clear that the First Amendment’s
religious protections do not crush the Thirteenth Amendment’s
guarantees. The ministerial exception is a powerful statutory bar,
so allowing the ministerial exception to operate in TVPA cases
would functionally place even the strongest violations of the
Thirteenth Amendment subservient to any minor First
Amendment violation. From a legal doctrine perspective, the
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude
and slavery should be firmly prioritized over the protections
provided to religious organizations under the Free Exercise and
Establishment clauses. This section will discuss the legal
justifications for placing TVPA cases outside the ministerial
exception’s reach.
43

Headley, 2010 WL 3184389, at *6.
See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S.
Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 2998 (2006) (arguing
that the TVPA was enacted to “revitalize” the protections of the Thirteenth
Amendment against involuntary servitude).
44
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A. The Thirteenth Amendment Supersedes the First Amendment in
a Constitutional Framework
When constitutional protections come into conflict, courts
must decide how to prioritize and sacrifice opposing rights.
Unlike the traditional labor dispute claims arising under the Fair
Labor Standards Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act,
human trafficking claims under the TVPA stem directly from the
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery and involuntary
servitude. 45 Following the Civil War, slavery and involuntary
servitude were deemed so abhorrent as to be specifically
outlawed by constitutional amendment. 46 The severity of this
constitutional prohibition is great enough to warrant distinct
treatment, and the law must treat human traffickers more
severely than it treats ordinary exploitative employers. American
jurisprudence supports this proposition: unlike other
constitutional amendments subject to balancing tests, courts
have historically understood the Thirteenth Amendment as
imposing an absolute and non-negotiable prohibition.47
Placing the Thirteenth Amendment above the First
Amendment is not a revolutionary idea. Despite the First
Amendment’s constitutional guarantee, courts and legislatures
have determined that the Free Speech clause is limited when
adversely positioned against the Thirteenth Amendment. 48 In
United States v. Bradley, 49 the First Circuit discussed a divide
between speech that consisted of “improper threats or coercion”
which would be outlawed and regulated by the TVPA, and
“permissible warnings of adverse but legitimate consequences”

45

Jennifer Mason McAward, The Thirteenth Amendment, Human Trafficking, and Hate
Crimes, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 829, 829 (2016) (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment basis
of the TVPA has never been questioned in court.”).
46
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
47
See, e.g., United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 485 (2d Cir. 1964) (“[T]he prime
purpose of those who outlawed ‘involuntary servitude’ in the predecessors of the
13th Amendment, in the Amendment itself, and in statutes enacted to enforce it, was
to abolish all practices whereby subjection having some of the incidents of slavery
was legally enforced.”); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439–42
(1968); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149 (1914); Richard
Delgado, Religious Totalism as Slavery, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 51, 53
(1979).
48
See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 151 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. granted,
judgment vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 1101 (2005).
49
390 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2004).
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that fall outside the scope of anti-trafficking regulation. 50 By
prohibiting “improper threats” intended to coerce trafficking
victims to enter into or remain in positions of involuntary
servitude, courts have already interpreted the TVPA as imposing
limitations on the First Amendment––here, the Free Speech
clause. 51 In the context of coercive speech, the Thirteenth
Amendment is not balanced against the First Amendment, but
instead entirely trumps it. If the Thirteenth Amendment can
restrict Free Speech, the same interpretive standard ought to be
applied when the Thirteenth Amendment enters into conflict
with the First Amendment’s religious provisions.
B. The Thirteenth Amendment Deliberately did not Carve out
Religious Protections
The Thirteenth Amendment does not prohibit all forms
of forced labor, but instead permits certain forms of involuntary
servitude to continue, namely as punishment for crimes. 52
Notably, no religious accommodation was provided in the
amendment. 53 Courts frequently look at historical
understandings and patterns of interpretation when analyzing
the Thirteenth Amendment, and such inquiries do not support
applying the ministerial exception to TVPA cases. 54 When
drafted, the Thirteenth Amendment specifically carved out
prison labor as an acceptable form of involuntary servitude.55
The drafters were particularly aware of the forms of servitude
they wished to permit, and the fact that the Thirteenth
Amendment’s deliberate carve-outs did not include any religious
protections means that it was never intended to fall subservient
to First Amendment claims.56 From a purposivist perspective,

50

Id. at 151.
Id.
52
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
53
Id.
54
See, e.g., Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916) (explaining that the Thirteenth
Amendment was intended to cover “those forms of compulsory labor akin to African
slavery which, in practical operation, would tend to produce like undesirable
results”); United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1167–68 (5th Cir. 1977) (explaining
that opportunity for escape did not defeat a slavery claim because slaves in the
antebellum period were often unsupervised). See also United States v. Kozminski, 487
U.S. 931, 945 (1988); L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
523 (1935); United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1984).
55
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
56
See Butler, 240 U.S. at 333 (“[The Thirteenth Amendment] introduced no novel
doctrine with respect of services always treated as exceptional.”).
51

2021]

MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION

religious protections should
Amendment concerns.

not

overwhelm

325
Thirteenth

Prior to the Civil War and the ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment, many religious organizations were
closely associated with and even owned slaves. 57 Several
southern churches owned and rented out slaves as a means of
covering church expenses. 58 Jennifer Oast explains that slave
ownership by Presbyterian churches in the American South often
“paid the minister’s salary and provided for other needs of the
church. In many cases the slaves were the only endowment the
congregation required.” 59 These churches saw slavery as a
worthwhile financial investment, not only for direct profits
associated with owning and leasing enslaved people, but also for
the “increase” that perpetuated slavery for generations.60
Religious institutions that did not hold slaves themselves,
such as the Jesuit Georgetown University, still maintained strong
ties to slavery.61 Georgetown University was largely financed by
income derived from slave plantations owned by the Jesuits who
helped found and maintain the school. 62 Slavery was so
fundamental to American religious life that it was one of the root
causes of the North/South schisms in the Baptist and
Presbyterian churches in the late nineteenth century.63 Church
ownership of slaves was a heavily debated and recognized reality
of American religious life, yet no special protections were
57

See, e.g., Jennifer Oast, “The Worst Kind of Slavery”: Slave-Owning Presbyterian
Churches in Prince Edward County, Virginia, 76 J.S. HIST. 867, (2010),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/27919282.
58
Id. at 868.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 869–70. Slavery was considered profitable both for the labor provided by
enslaved people and for their potential to have children who would be born into
slavery and could be either sold, leased, or forced to labor for the economic benefit of
their proprietary church. Id.
61
See, e.g., What We Know: Georgetown University and Slavery, GEO. SLAVERY ARCHIVE
(2015), http://slaveryarchive.georgetown.edu/items/show/4 (last visited Oct. 18,
2020).
62
Id.
63
See Oast, supra note 57, at 899; James Moorehead, Presbyterians and Slavery,
PRINCETON AND SLAVERY, https://slavery.princeton.edu/stories/presbyterians-andslavery (last accessed Oct. 10, 2020); Tom Gjelten, Southern Baptist Seminary Confronts
History of Slavery and ‘Deep Racism’, NPR KQED (Dec. 13, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/12/13/676333342/southern-baptist-seminary-confrontshistory-of-slaveholding-and-deep-racism; Adeel Hassan, Oldest Institution of Southern
Baptist Convention Reveals Past Ties to Slavery, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/us/southern-baptist-slavery.html.
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afforded to religious institutions in the Thirteenth Amendment.
Slaves owned by these organizations were emancipated
alongside all other American slaves.
The Thirteenth Amendment’s failure to carve-out exceptions
for religious organizations in the face of widespread slave
ownership by churches at the time of its ratification is
informative: The Thirteenth Amendment was always intended
to supersede the First Amendment’s religious freedom
protections.
C. The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses do not Provide
Immunity for Religious Organizations
Despite the revered importance of the First Amendment’s
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, courts have imposed
limitations on the reach of the First Amendment’s religious
protections in numerous settings. There is no legal justification
for making religious protections uniquely inviolable in the
human trafficking realm. In Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith, 64 the Supreme Court explained that
“the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general
applicability.”65 In Prince v. Massachusetts, 66 the Supreme Court
stated that “the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public
interest, as against a claim of religious liberty.” 67 Similarly,
parents are required to vaccinate their school children, even if
such vaccination goes against their religious beliefs.68 Individuals
may not “engage in religious practices inconsistent with the
peace, safety and health of the inhabitants of the State.”69
Courts have also rejected the notion that the owner of a
restaurant may refuse to serve people of color because of a
religious belief against racial intermixing.70 In Newman v. Piggie
64

494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
Id. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66
321 U.S. 158 (1944).
67
Id. at 166.
68
See Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905); see also
Cude v. State, 337 S.W.2d 816, 819 (1964).
69
Cude, 337 S.W.2d at 819.
70
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941, 945 (D.S.C.
1966), rev’d, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff’d, 390 U.S. 400 (1968). But see
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
65
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Park Enterprises, Inc., 71 the court readily denied a restaurant
owner’s First Amendment free exercise claims, stating “[t]his
court refuses to lend credence or support to his position that he
has a constitutional right to refuse to serve members of the Negro
race in his business establishments upon the ground that to do so
would violate his sacred religious beliefs.”72
Courts have already limited the extent of freedoms that
religious organizations have when contravening certain larger
societal norms. For example, the Supreme Court upheld a
prohibition on polygamy, despite it being part of the explicit
religious doctrine of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints.73 In Reynolds v. United States,74 the Court firmly stated that
“professed doctrines of religious belief” would not supersede the
“law of the land.”75 Discussing the prohibition on polygamy, the
Court stated, “[i]t is impossible to believe that the constitutional
guaranty of religious freedom was intended to prohibit
legislation in respect to this most important feature of social
life.”76

1724 (2018) (permitting a cake shop owner to refuse to customers based on the
owner’s religious beliefs).
71
Newman, 256 F. Supp. at 941.
72
Id. at 945.
73
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
74
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
75
Id. at 167.
76
Id. at 165. Despite not having a dedicated constitutional amendment, marriage was
deemed a “fundamental” right that resides within “constitutional imperatives” by the
Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670–71
(2015). Yet even with the heightened status of marriage as a constitutional right, the
Supreme Court still found itself balancing the First Amendment rights of the shop
owner––both religious and speech––against “an otherwise valid exercise of state
power” in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018). Despite an outcome expanding religious
protections, the Court still engaged in more detailed analysis than it would in a
ministerial exception case. The cake shop owner was not permitted to simply claim a
religious exemption and avoid any fact-based inquiry. The Court noted that whether
a cake shop owner had the right to refuse service to a same-sex couple seeking a
wedding cake because of the owner’s religious beliefs was a “delicate question,” but
ultimately determined that an explicit constitutional provision took precedence over
a state statute, the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. Id. Quite the opposite––
Masterpiece Cakeshop reached the Supreme Court after a hearing by the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission. Had the cake shop been operated as part of a religious group,
like so many businesses, that fired someone for their sexuality, then no fact-based
inquiry or balancing of factors would have occurred. Instead, pleading the ministerial
exception at the summary judgment level would have sufficed to give the cake shop
owners a free pass.
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The Reynolds Court also drew a notable distinction
between belief and action to explain away First Amendment
issues, writing, “[l]aws are made for the government of actions,
and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and
opinions, they may with practices.” 77 The Court went on to
provide examples of scenarios that, similar to polygamy, would
not be deemed acceptable regardless of religious belief.78 These
included human sacrifice and the burning of a wife when her
husband dies.79 It seems reasonable to place human trafficking
within the same category of morally unacceptable behaviors that
ought to be regulated and prohibited, regardless of religious
belief.
Further, the ministerial exception was never intended to
be inviolable, and it should not become one of the few federal
doctrines without any exception. The Second Circuit has
separately noted that boundaries to the ministerial exception do
indeed exist, although the court did not delineate these specific
limits.80 Given the admitted existence of areas untouched by the
ministerial exception, it seems more than reasonable to believe
that human trafficking and slavery would be among of them.
Courts have been willing to impose numerous restrictions on the
unfettered free exercise of religion for the promotion of overall
societal objectives,81 and a similar exception should be made to
allow for the enforcement of human trafficking prohibitions.
There is no legal doctrine that requires, or supports, deeming the
ministerial exception untouchable and superior to all other
constitutional rights and doctrines arising out of the First
Amendment.
D. Regardless of the Ministerial Exception’s Outgrowth to Cover
All Employment Decisions, Human Trafficking Falls Outside
the Scope of Labor Disputes
The application and discussion of ministerial exception case
law suggests that the ministerial exception was intended
primarily for use in the labor setting and, as originally
contemplated, the ministerial exception would not have directed
77

Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
Id.
79
Id.
80
See Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that boundaries
to the ministerial exception exist but refusing to extend them to the present case).
81
See supra notes 64–76 and accompanying text.
78
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itself at Thirteenth Amendment issues. 82 The ministerial
exception, even in its expanded form, can remain entirely intact
without being applied to TVPA claims since human trafficking
and slavery are not mere extensions of labor disputes, but
comprise something else altogether.
Human trafficking is not properly bounded as a labor
issue and merits a distinct treatment. In Shukla, Magistrate Judge
Pollak rightfully resisted the popular desire to confine human
trafficking within the labor law framework.83 Unlike traditional
labor disputes stemming from wage claims and workplace
conditions, slavery and trafficking rest on the coercion of labor,
regardless of payment to the victim.84 While forced labor clearly
falls on the labor spectrum, its position on that spectrum is so
extreme that it necessitates additional remedies and distinct
consideration, especially given its unique Thirteenth
Amendment status. Confining human trafficking to generic
employment law would redefine trafficking as a practice that
could be validly contained in contracts and business
arrangements. Nothing could stray further away from public
policy. Unlike employment disputes rooted in contract law,
human trafficking is fundamentally about the infringement of
personal liberty. 85 Human trafficking manages to be

82

See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S.
171, 188 (2012) (explaining that the ministerial exception “precludes application of
[employment discrimination] claims concerning the employment relationship
between a religious institution and its ministers”). Interestingly, one dissenting
opinion in a lower court case applying the ministerial exception addressed the
concern that the absence of federal jurisdiction within religious organizations could
lead to abuses in power. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85
P.3d 67, 105 n.6 (2004) (Brown J., dissenting) (“[I]t is not clear how an employer is
in a position to impose anything on its employees to which they object. (U.S. Const.,
13th Amend. [prohibiting slavery or involuntary servitude].) Only the state, which
holds the monopoly on coercive force, can compel adults to remain where they do
not choose to be and do what they do not wish to do.”).
83
Shukla v. Sharma, No. 07 CV 2972 (CBA), 2009 WL 10690810, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 21, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, No. 07-CV-2972 (CBA), 2009 WL
3151109 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009).
84
See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a), (b)(24) (stating that trafficking is “by means of force,
fraud, or coercion”); Headley v. Church of Scientology Int'l, 687 F.3d 1173, 1181
(9th Cir. 2012) (finding that the Headleys did not establish a genuine issue of
material fact that their labor was obtained “‘by means of’ improper conduct” for their
TVPA claim).
85
See People v. Guyton, 20 Cal. App. 5th 499, 506, 229 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 122
(2018), rev. denied (May 9, 2018) (“Human trafficking entails a deprivation
of liberty.”).
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simultaneously both a labor issue, and something entirely
distinct.
Since human trafficking should not be treated as an
employment practice, the ministerial exception’s application in
the sphere of employment decisions should have no bearing on
whether the ministerial exception should cover TVPA claims.
When refusing to apply the ministerial exception to Shukla’s
lawsuit, Magistrate Judge Pollack properly reasoned that
“[g]iven the relative magnitude of the deprivation of individual
liberty in cases covered by the TVPA, and the international scope
and significance of human trafficking, the TVPA transcends the
boundaries of the ministerial exception.”86
III. NORMATIVELY, THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION OUGHT
NOT BE APPLIED TO THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
Extending the ministerial exception’s reach to cover
human trafficking cases would be an inappropriate and unwise
expansion of the First Amendment that violates societal norms
and enables the perpetuation of slavery within the United States.
Shukla did not win his TVPA claim despite the court’s refusal to
apply the ministerial exception as a jurisdictional bar; 87 and
given the fact pattern and previous cases, it is unlikely that the
Headleys would have won their trafficking claim against the
Church of Scientology either. But regardless of the particulars of
these two cases, expanding the ministerial exception to TVPA
suits creates a significant danger that must not be ignored. A
court applying the ministerial exception to dismiss a TVPA case
effectively makes the determination that no matter how heinous
the alleged human trafficking violation, it is more important to
protect the First Amendment interests of religious organizations.
A. Religious Organizations are Not Necessarily Aligned with the
Moral “Good”
Religious organizations are not immune from trafficking
concerns and human rights abuses solely by virtue of their
religious missions. Mainstream religions have been accused of
86

Shukla, 2009 WL 10690810, at *7.
Shukla v. Sharma, No. 07-CV-2972 (CBA), 2009 WL 3151109, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2009).
87
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numerous human rights violations, notably the Catholic
Church’s most recent child sex abuse cover-up.88 The Catholic
Church spent over $4 billion in pay outs between 1980 and 2019
to settle sex abuse cases involving their clergy.89 It was estimated
that in 2020, over 5,000 new cases would come to light in
California, New York, and New Jersey alone due to openings in
statute of limitation windows for child sex abuse cases across the
country.90
Religious doctrine alone does not protect against abuses,
and religious institutions remain subject to criminal laws.91 The
civil cause of action within the TVPA was not included in the
original bill and was instead added later as part of the TVPA’s
reauthorization in 2003 to bolster the fight against human
trafficking.92 The criminal and civil provisions operate in tandem
as a “comprehensive and coordinated campaign to eliminate
modern forms of slavery.”93
The types of abuses alleged in Shukla and Headley are
reminiscent of the behavior patterns exhibited by non-religious
traffickers. The Headleys feared escaping the Sea Org not only
because they were monitored and escorted by other members of
the organizations, but also because the ‘base’ they lived on
contained over $100 million of audio/visual security equipment,
and the couple had received threats of being harmed upon
leaving.94 Marc Headley also specifically alleged three instances
of physical force being used against him.95 The alleged abuses of
the Church of Scientology are not limited to the Headleys;
outside of the Headley lawsuit, other Sea Org members have
alleged that they have been held against their will and forced to
88

Bernard Condon & Jim Mustian, Surge of New Abuse Claims Threatens Catholic
Church Like Never Before, PBS NEWS HOUR (Dec. 3, 2019, 12:27 AM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/surge-of-new-abuse-claims-threatenscatholic-church-like-never-before.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Emp. Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(“[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability.’”).
92
Human Trafficking Key Legislation, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/humantrafficking/key-legislation.
93
Id.
94
See Headley v. Church of Scientology Int’l, 687 F.3d 1173, 1176–77 (9th Cir.
2012).
95
Id. at 1180.
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work 100 hours per week doing tasks such as compiling
Scientology literature for almost no pay.96 Similar to many other
trafficking victims, Shukla had his passport confiscated, became
an undocumented immigrant, and was subjected to a
combination of physical and verbal abuse as he was forced to
labor.97
Religion ought not excuse trafficking. Regardless of
whether traffickers are genuinely motivated by their religions, or
whether they are merely employing religion as a cover-up for
their trafficking practices, traffickers should not be permitted to
shield themselves behind religious doctrine while enslaving
vulnerable populations. Religious organizations also include
“new religions,” popularly referred to as “cults,” 98 several of
which have already faced criminal trafficking prosecutions over
the years. For example, leaders of the religious group House of
Judah were convicted for putting children in their congregation
into positions of involuntary servitude.99 Eldridge Broussard was
convicted of twenty-nine counts of involuntary servitude through
his work leading the Eccelesia Athletic Association, which
enslaved children and forced them to undergo rigorous athletic
training to compete in sporting tournaments for profit. 100
Unfortunately, prosecutors are unable to criminally convict all
religious trafficking cases, and, as a result, the trafficking legal
landscape relies heavily on the TVPA’s civil remedies. Allowing
religious organizations to take advantage of the ministerial
exception in TVPA settings will enable the perpetuation of
Thirteenth Amendment violations.

96

Scientology’s ‘Slave Labor’ Scandal, THE WEEK (Mar. 29, 2010),
https://theweek.com/articles/495686/scientologys-slave-labor-scandal.
97
Shukla v. Sharma, No. 07-CV-2972 (CBA), 2009 WL 3151109, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2009).
98
Tina Rodia, Is it a cult, or a new religious movement?, PENN TODAY (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://penntoday.upenn.edu/news/it-cult-or-new-religious-movement.
99
United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1277 (6th Cir. 1988).
100
United States v. Broussard, 767 F. Supp. 1536, 1538 (D. Or. 1991), amended, 767
F. Supp. 1545 (D. Or. 1991).
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B. Extending the Ministerial Exception to Include TVPA Cases
Creates a Safe Harbor for Human Trafficking via Religious
Organizations
Traffickers seeking civil protection for their crimes can
easily exploit the ministerial exception by claiming to run a
religious organization. New religions are relatively easy to set up
and receive the same First Amendment protections as more
established religious groups. 101 If the ministerial exception is
found to apply to TVPA cases, individuals hoping to profit from
forced labor will be able to disguise themselves as religious
entities and avail themselves of the vast benefits of the ministerial
exception at little cost. 102 The district court’s approach in
Headley, if adopted by the Ninth Circuit, would effectively
preclude all civil liability for human traffickers who hide behind
the veil of a religious order.103
As applied in Headley, the ministerial exception provides
a safe harbor for religious organizations that make their members
and employees engage in forced labor. A trafficker need not even
establish their own religious group to take advantage of this
liability shield, since even religiously affiliated schools, hospitals,
and corporations have been found to qualify as religious
institutions for purposes of applying the ministerial exception.104
Courts have left open the possibility that the ministerial
exception might also apply to for-profit religious entities, rather
than exclusively to not-for-profit ones. 105 Combining for-profit
ventures with the economic incentives behind human trafficking
is reckless and can lead to devastating real-world consequences,
101

United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (“The religious views espoused by
respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those
doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity,
then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of
fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain. The First Amendment does
not select any one group or any one type of religion for preferred treatment.”).
102
Id.
103
Where it has been applied, the ministerial exception has led to widespread
dismissal of disputes involving religious organizations. C.f. Shukla v. Sharma, No. 07
CV 2972 (CBA), 2009 WL 10690810, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2009), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 07-CV-2972 (CBA), 2009 WL 3151109 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
29, 2009) (citing Kraft v. Rector, Churchwardens & Vestry of Grace Church in N.Y.,
No. 01–CV–7871 (KMW), 2004 WL 540327, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2004)).
104
See Shukla, 2009 WL 10690810, at *4.
105
Id. at *5; c.f. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (granting
other religious protections to for-profit corporations).
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especially as the Supreme Court continues to expand religious
protections.
Business ventures with religious ties have already been
known to engage in practices that likely constitute human
trafficking. For example, the MudMan burger chain in Montana
had been staffing its restaurants with “interns” who worked sixty
hours per week, while receiving as little as $2 an hour
compensation. 106 These “interns” had all been recruited from
Potter’s Field, an evangelical Christian group run by MudMan’s
owners.107 Similarly, the Holy Tabernacle Born Again Faith Inc.
religious organization forced children at the McCollum Ranch
to work over forty hours a week in fish markets, where they
would engage in dangerous manual labor, with little to no pay.108
If religious organizations are granted protection against human
trafficking claims, more of these types of arrangements are likely
to emerge.
The ministerial exception’s extreme deference to religious
organizations makes it too easy for ill-intentioned individuals to
abuse. Combatting human trafficking is an incredibly
challenging endeavor, and opening the door for shrewd
traffickers to disguise themselves as religious organizations can
cause extensive damage to the fight against human trafficking.
Trafficking rings can be highly sophisticated, and it is naïve to
underestimate the ability of traffickers to adapt to a changing
legal landscape. 109 The highly-structured NXIVM trafficking
ring, for example, received cult accusations as early as 2003, but
it took nearly fifteen years for authorities to successfully build a
legal case against the organization.110 Too often, authorities are
unwilling or unable to prosecute human trafficking cases, and the
TVPA’s civil remedies are central to the anti-human trafficking
landscape. The decision to prioritize First Amendment
considerations over Thirteenth Amendment realities by
106

Pilar Melendez, Montana Pastor Accused of Abusing His Flock Reopens His Burger
Chain to Outrage, THE DAILY BEAST (May 19, 2020),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/potters-field-minister-michael-rozell-reopensmudman-burger-chain-despite-abuse-allegations.
107
Id.
108
Martha Quillin, How Could This Alleged Child Slavery Happen? Religious Freedom
Helped it Stay Hidden, NEWS & OBSERVER (Feb. 08, 2018),
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article199116809.html.
109
Alexandra Stein, Keith Raniere Nxivm Trial: Why It's So Hard to Stop a Cult, BBC
NEWS (June 20, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-48635278.
110
Sharon Thorne, Cult of Personality, FORBES (Oct. 12, 2003),
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2003/1013/088.html?sh=5bfc25361853.
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following the Headley district court approach will have
devastating impacts for both victims and survivors of human
trafficking.
IV. INTERPRETIVE ALTERNATIVES TO AVOID THE
TRAPPINGS OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
As suggested above, optimally the Supreme Court should
adopt the approach emerging in the Second Circuit through the
Eastern District of New York and limit the ministerial exception
so that TVPA cases fall outside of its reach. This blanket
restriction on the ministerial exception’s scope would properly
align with the relevant jurisprudence and avoid dangerous
practical ramifications. However, if the Court is unwilling to
eliminate the ministerial exception in human trafficking cases
altogether, it can still embrace numerous interpretive alternatives
that will attain similar outcomes while providing greater
deference to First Amendment concerns. This section will
discuss four of these alternatives––three of which can be readily
embraced and one of which has already been discussed in the
literature, but warrants caution.
A. First Alternative – Constrain the Ministerial Exception to
Employment Decisions Based on Doctrinal Issues
The scope of the First Amendment’s religious protections
is generally limited to issues that directly infringe on religion, as
opposed to providing freedom from regulation altogether. 111
Compared to other First Amendment doctrines, the ministerial
exception has uniquely outgrown the confines of the First
Amendment. Even in the landmark Burwell v. Hobby Lobby112 case
that is recognized as having widely expanded religious
protections, the Supreme Court only exempted Hobby Lobby
from following the Food and Drug Administration’s contraceptive
mandate in its health insurance plan and did not exclude Hobby
Lobby Stores from FDA regulation as a whole.113 Yet this typical
111

Emp. Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
573 U.S. 682 (2014).
113
Id. at 692. Even though Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. dealt with religious
freedom under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, as opposed to directly under
the First Amendment, this comparison is helpful to understand the treatment of
religious liberties.
112
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approach to safeguarding First Amendment protections has not
been paralleled with ministerial exception pleadings. Instead of
restricting the ministerial exception to cases involving specific,
actual doctrinal entanglement, courts adopted a broader
interpretation that places all employment-related decisions under
the scope of the First Amendment.114 To restrain the reach of the
ministerial exception, courts could use the same approach
employed in other First Amendment areas by first determining
whether the facts underlying a dispute are based in doctrine, and
only then applying the ministerial exception as a jurisdictional
bar.
Currently, the ministerial exception is not restricted to
cases related to religious doctrine. For example, in Our Lady of
Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru,115 the Supreme Court applied
the ministerial exception to the firing of a teacher at a religious
school who had requested medical leave for breast cancer
treatment.116 The school explained that they fired the teacher for
“poor performance--namely, a failure to observe the planned
curriculum and keep an orderly classroom.”117 The dismissal was
not attributed to any doctrinally-related issues, yet the ministerial
exception still barred the suit from moving forward.118 This type
of decision-making would be the equivalent of courts allowing
Hobby Lobby Stores to claim that its religious views impact
healthcare decisions, and therefore no regulation whatsoever of
employee health care plans would be permitted. Following the
logic of the ministerial exception, any court’s analysis to
determine whether a particular aspect of a health plan had any
connection to the organization’s religious doctrine would
therefore be forbidden and deemed “excessive entanglement.”
The ministerial exception has grown to essentially protect
all hiring and firing decisions. It provides religious organizations
with full discretion over the treatment of its employees under the
rationale that religions should be able to choose their
114

See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 48 F. Supp. 2d 505, 515 (E.D.N.C.
1999), aff'd, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Spirit v. Nat'l
Labor Relations Bd., 947 F.3d 824, 834 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Cmty. Econ. Dev., Inc. v.
Cote, No. TTD CV 07-5001261-S, 2008 WL 5481209, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec.
1, 2008).
115
140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
116
Id. at 2059.
117
Id.
118
Id.
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proselytizers.119 Several lower courts have applied the ministerial
exception as a jurisdictional bar to employment suits involving
religious organizations, regardless of whether any connection
between religious doctrine and the contested employment
decision existed. 120 While some employment decisions are
directly related to religious doctrine––such as the Catholic
Church requiring priests to be male––others, such as decisions
based on an individual’s race, age, or disability status, as well as
those based on poor workplace performance, may have nothing
to do with a religion’s doctrine. Even so, the ministerial
exception affords all cases the same broad protection. This
expansion of the ministerial exception goes beyond what is
necessary and effectively exempts religious organizations from
all employment laws.121
Courts can limit this free pass by requiring religious
organizations that plead the ministerial exception to have a
doctrinal reason behind contested employment decisions. A
religious organization that provides a good-faith doctrinal
rationale for its decision would be afforded the full ministerial
exception, while those that cannot would be subject to the same
rules and regulations as other employers. Deference could still be
afforded to a religious organization’s own interpretations of
doctrine, but the ministerial exception would no longer affect
matters where it ought not be applied. For example, traditional
wage and hour disputes would not fall under the ministerial
exception insofar as religious doctrine does not establish a
minimum wage or regulate overtime. Importantly, the First
119

See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565
U.S. 171, 196 (2012) (barring employment discrimination suits by a minister
challenging her court’s decision to fire her); Lee v. Sixth Mount Zion Baptist Church
of Pittsburgh, 903 F.3d 113, 121 (3d Cir. 2018) (applying the ministerial exception to
employment contract disputes); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir.
2008) (applying the ministerial exception to bar a Title VII claim due to
“impermissible entanglement”); Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference of United
Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying the ministerial
exception to a disability discrimination suit brought by a minister who was “forced to
resign” because of the Church’s refusal to make reasonable accommodations).
120
See, e.g., Combs v. Central Tex. Annual Conference, 173 F.3d 343, 345–50 (C.A.5
1999); E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 800–01 (C.A. 4th 2000);
Natal v. Christian & Missionary All., 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989); Petruska
v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303–07 (C.A.3 2006); Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 204–
09.
121
See Lee, 903 F.3d at 122 (“[W]e are not aware of any court that has ruled on the
merits (i.e., not applied the ministerial exception) of a breach of contract claim
alleging wrongful termination of a religious leader by a religious institution.”).
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Amendment does not prohibit all religious entanglement, but
only excessive entanglement. 122 The initial determination of
whether a decision is based on doctrine would not constitute the
level of entanglement frowned-upon in our legal system, since an
organization unable to provide a doctrinal reason for its decision
would not suffer any doctrinal incursions by further judicial
analysis.123
This approach would allow TVPA cases to move forward
because human trafficking is not a permitted religious practice,
regardless of doctrine. Religious organizations would not be able
to benefit from the ministerial exception in trafficking lawsuits
because “the standards that govern what constitutes trafficking
and forced labor do not depend on the interpretation of religious
doctrine.”124 This method would also avoid excessive religious
entanglement because human trafficking is analyzed entirely
through a secular framework.
At its core, the ministerial exception is about providing
religious organizations with the freedom to make their own
doctrinal decisions without judicial interference. Requiring an
organization to state a piece of doctrine justifying a disputed
employment decision would protect First Amendment interests
while avoiding the pitfalls of an overly broad ministerial
exception.
B. Second Alternative – Raise the Standard for Determining which
Employees are Covered by the Ministerial Exception
In Our Lady of Guadalupe, the Supreme Court
reinterpreted its previous standards for determining which
employees were covered for the purposes of the ministerial
exception. Prior to this decision, courts had adopted the fourfactor test established in Hosanna-Tabor to determine when the
122

Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
See First Amendment - Ministerial Exception - Ninth Circuit Avoids Constitutional
Question, Holding That Ministers did not State a Claim That Church of Scientology Violated
Trafficking Victims Protection Act - Headley v. Church of Scientology Int'l, 687 F. 3d,
126 HARV. L. REV. 2121, 2123 (2013) (explaining that the Headley court could have
“emphasized that the Establishment Clause prohibits only excessive entanglement” to
resolve the case in a narrower manner).
124
Shukla v. Sharma, No. 07 CV 2972 (CBA), 2009 WL 10690810, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 21, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, No. 07-CV-2972 (CBA), 2009 WL
3151109 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009).
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exception applied. 125 In Our Lady of Guadalupe, however, the
Supreme Court rejected a strict factor-based approach and
instead determined that “[w]hat matters, at bottom, is what an
employee does.”126 This functional approach had the potential to
limit the ministerial exception by applying it only to individuals
highly ranked within religious organizations. Unfortunately,
however, Our Lady of Guadalupe permits religious organizations
to decide for themselves which employees conduct essential
functions, and, therefore, should be covered by the ministerial
exception. 127 Given the powerful operation of the ministerial
exception at the summary judgment level, the effect of this
decision is to “allow[] employers to decide for themselves
whether discrimination is actionable.”128 With such unchecked
discretion, no organization would choose to subject itself to
judicial scrutiny, and the ministerial exception effectively serves
as a complete civil liability shield. This broad interpretation
allows even employees who are not members of the same
religion as the organization to fall under the ministerial
exception’s reach.129
Instead of bestowing religious organizations with such
broad discretion, courts could engage in a more substantive
analysis to determine whether an individual performs functions
that are indeed crucial to the ministerial functioning of a religious
organization. As Justice Sotomayor explains in her dissent,
“[a]lthough certain religious functions may be important to a
church, a person’s performance of some of those functions does
not mechanically trigger a categorical exemption from generally
applicable antidiscrimination laws.” 130 It is the courts’ job to
make these determinations.
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Hosanna-Tabor looked at the following four factors to determine whether an
employee was covered by the ministerial exception: 1) whether the minister was
bestowed with formal religious title, 2) whether the title reflected training and
ministerial substance, 3) whether the employee embraced the title and held
themselves out as a minister, and 4) whether the employee’s job included important
religious functions. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 191–92 (2012).
126
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2059 (2020).
127
Id. at 2070 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“What qualifies as ‘ministerial’ is an
inherently theological question, and thus one that cannot be resolved by civil courts
through legal analysis.”).
128
Id. at 2076 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
129
Id.
130
Id.
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By engaging in this low level of substantive analysis and
sacrificing a fraction of the vast protections currently afforded to
religious entities, courts—not self-interested religious
organizations—would determine whether an employee ought to
be covered by the ministerial exception. Courts would consider
someone’s role within the organization to decide whether they
fall within the ministerial exception’s original intent. After
conducting this preliminary finding, if an employee is deemed to
be a proselytizing ‘minister,’ courts could continue to apply the
ministerial exception as a bar to an employee’s claims. However,
if the employee is not deemed to be truly performing a crucial
religious function, courts would engage in the same analysis
afforded in other employment settings and provide each side
with the requisite due process as the case moves forward.
Refusal to apply the ministerial exception to certain
employees would not automatically necessitate a negative
finding against the religious organization. Indeed, at this point,
religious organizations would be in the same position as other
employers facing comparable suits, and courts would proceed by
engaging in the merits of the case. If needed to account for an
organization’s religious doctrine and purpose, religious entities
could be allowed to introduce doctrinal arguments for their
employment decisions that would be unavailable to secular
employers. Such a judicial investigation does not improperly
infringe on First Amendment protections, for if this were the
case, religious organizations would be entirely immune from
laws. 131 In affording special protections for religious
organizations, we must remember that a religious mission does
not negate an organization’s status as an employer and must not
exempt it from all labor-related regulations.
C. Third Alternative – Give Force to the “Outward Physical Acts”
Distinction
The Supreme Court first considered the ministerial
exception in Hosanna-Tabor, where it established a key
distinction that could be better developed to properly restrict the
131

C.f. Bob Jones Uni. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983) (holding that the
First Amendment did not prohibit the Internal Revenue Service’s revocation of a
religious university’s tax exempt status in response to the university engaging in
racial discrimination, which was found to be contrary to a “fundamental national
public policy”).
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ministerial exception’s scope. 132 Ministerial exception
jurisprudence has not yet delved into Hosanna-Tabor’s exclusion
of outward physical acts from the ministerial exception’s reach.
“The
Court
in Hosanna-Tabor expressly
distinguished ‘government regulation of only outward physical
acts’––which
it
found
to
be
permissible––from
impermissible ‘government interference with an internal church
decision that affects the faith and mission of the church
itself.’” 133 Developing this distinction between the permissible
regulation of outward physical acts and the impermissible
regulation of internal church decisions could help restrain the
scope of the ministerial exception.
The Hosanna-Tabor court created the outward physical act
caveat to distinguish between the present case involving teachers
at a religious school and Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.134 In Smith, the court upheld
Oregon’s prohibition on peyote use, regardless of its effect on
religious practice. 135 The Hosanna-Tabor Court set up a
distinction based not on the regulatory laws being enforced, but
on the effect of their enforcement. The Court explains that while
the Americans with Disabilities Act’s prohibition on retaliation
and Oregon’s prohibition on peyote use are both “valid and
neutral law[s] of general applicability,” the effect of the laws
differ since “a church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an
individual’s ingestion of peyote.” 136 The Court continues
drawing out the contrasting nature of these cases, stating that
“Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical
acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns government
interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith
and mission of the church itself.”137
132

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171,
195 (2012).
133
United States v. Thompson, 896 F.3d 155, 166 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.
Ct. 2715 (2019) (citing Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190).
134
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
135
Since Hosanna-Tabor, Smith has been superseded by the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 [hereinafter RFRA]. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2018).
RFRA was enacted “to provide greater protection for religious exercise than is
available under the First Amendment.” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 357 (2015).
Nonetheless, the history of Smith does not negate Hosanna-Tabor’s built-in distinction
of outward physical acts and interference with internal church decisions.
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Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 at 190.
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This distinction between outward acts and internal
decisions could be explored further and applied to involuntary
servitude cases. The line is tricky, but it can be drawn. HosannaTabor dealt with an individual being removed from the religious
hierarchy and excused from their ministerial duties, which
would qualify as an internal decision.138 This type of decision is
fundamentally what the ministerial exception was designed to
protect from government interference. In contrast, involuntary
servitude cases are not based on shifting roles within a religious
organization, but are instead premised on non-consensual forced
labor, which has a definitively outward effect. Forcing an
unwilling individual to labor is an act that has an external effect
extending well beyond the religious organization’s internal
management.
D. Fourth Alternative – Apply the “Harm Principle” when
Analyzing the Ministerial Exception
The ministerial exception could be constrained by
imposing an internal balancing test that operates within the
limits of the First Amendment. Molly Gerratt advocates for
employing the “harm principle” in the ministerial exception
analysis.139 The “harm principle” in this context would balance
the religious conduct that would otherwise be protected under
the First Amendment against the harm that it imposes on
individuals.140
Applied to the ministerial exception, the harm principle
would have courts determine “whether a state’s interest in
employment regulation laws is ‘compelling’ and whether that
state interest outweighs a religious institution’s free exercise
rights.” 141 Under this framework, anti-trafficking protections
contained within the Thirteenth Amendment would not be
138

Id. at 171.
Molly A. Gerratt, Closing a Loophole: Headley v. Church of Scientology International as
an Argument for Placing Limits on the Ministerial Exception from Clergy Disputes, 85 S.
CAL. L. REV. 141, 142 (2011).
140
Id. at 177. The harm principle traces back to the early foundations of American
laws and early political philosophers such as John Locke and John Stuart Mill and
can be identified throughout American jurisprudence. Marci A. Hamilton, Religious
Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1116
(2004) (referring to the “harm principle” as the “no-harm principle”); see, e.g.,
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944); Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); Com. v. Bonadio,
415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980).
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Gerratt, supra note 139, at 182.
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maintained per se but would likely be permitted to move forward
after courts made their own analyses of whether the alleged
harms are sufficiently serious to warrant some infringement
upon the First Amendment. In all likelihood, human trafficking
would constitute a severe enough harm to circumvent religious
protections provided by the ministerial exception.
The “harm principle” would still afford significant room
for court interpretation and would require courts to engage in
individualized analyses based on the facts of the cases before
them. With this broad discretion for court enforcement and
application, the harm principle could severely constrain the
ministerial exception in a multitude of scenarios––not just those
involving human trafficking.
There are, however, substantial risks to this approach.
The harm principle could easily be interpreted to prioritize the
harms that religious organizations may face without their
expansive First Amendment protections and serve to continue
the expansion of religious protections at the expense of
individual rights. The major drawback of the harm principle
resides in its broad definition of “harm,” which can be easily coopted and would lead to unintended consequences. Concepts
such as “psychic harm” and “communal harm” may ultimately
restrict liberties and affect other politically salient issues such as
LGBT rights and abortion access.142 While the harm principle
could restrict religious protections granted via the ministerial
exception and safeguard Thirteenth Amendment rights, it could
also have the opposite effect. Given the broadness of alreadyexisting religious protections, and the large space afforded for
religious considerations, this Article does not advocate for the
use of the harm principle to mitigate the reach of the ministerial
exception.
CONCLUSION
The ministerial exception exists to protect religious
organizations from the type of government interference that
would prevent the fulfillment of religious missions. It does not
exist to exempt religious organizations from all laws and
142

See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Is the Harm Principle Illiberal?, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 1
(2006).
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regulations, and it certainly does not exist to give religious
organizations a free pass to traffic their employees. The
Trafficking Victims Protection Act is a vital piece of legislation
that provides survivors of human trafficking with civil remedies
against the infringement of their constitutional Thirteenth
Amendment rights. The First Amendment’s Free Exercise and
Establishment clauses must not be interpreted to vanquish
Thirteenth Amendment protections. Such an approach would be
counter to public policy and to the original intent and mission of
the Thirteenth Amendment, which deliberately did not carve out
an exemption for religious organizations.
Permitting the use of the ministerial exception as a
defense to TVPA cases is improper from both legal and
normative perspectives. Human trafficking in religious
organizations is an unfortunately common occurrence, and
religious traffickers must not be excused solely by virtue of their
religious status. Courts handling TVPA cases should not permit
the use of the ministerial exception as a jurisdictional bar given
the unique legal status that human trafficking has in American
law. The Thirteenth Amendment must not be reduced to simply
another manifestation of labor laws that fall subservient to broad
religious freedoms in the United States and must instead be
upheld as constitutionally vital and crucial to the fight against
human trafficking.

